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COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE POLICE:
EXPERIENCE OF THE COMMUNITY RIGHTS
DIVISION OF THE PHILADELPHIA
DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
Lois B. SORiWARTZ t
The Civil Rights Committee of the Philadelphia Bar Association,
with the concurrence of the district attorney of Philadelphia, requested
me to examine some of the district attorney's files relating to complaints
of violence made against members of the Philadelphia Police Department. The district attorney's office opened its files to me and made its
personnel available for consultation. I examined approximately twentyfive files. Sixteen of them, involving twenty complainants, were closely
analyzed. The selection was unsystematic. Some were pulled at
random from the filing case, but most were suggested by one person or
another as matters on which controversy or publicity had centered.
The period covered was mostly 1968-69, with a few files from 1970.
Of the twenty-five files, nine, including four of those carefully
studied, provided no basis for questioning the district attorney's judgment that prosecution would not have been warranted, no indication
that further investigation would have been in order, and nothing of any
special interest in evaluating the entire process of handling complaints.
This is not to say that the complainant's story was false. Often it was
circumstantial and plausible, but that is not enough to warrant prosecution of a policeman when the events reported might be interpreted in
several ways, the complainant is not corroborated, and the police
plausibly contradict the complainant. Four other files seemed clearly
appropriate for prosecution. No prosecutions had occurred. In classifying the cases as prosecution-worthy, I do not mean that convictions
would have been obtained. The difficulty of persuading judges and
juries to rule against the police in such matters is illustrated by the
outcome of a very recent prosecution which the district attorney did
institute against two policemen for the fatal shooting of a boy. The
seemingly strong case was dismissed on preliminary hearing after
testimony by thirty-seven witnesses.'
In the remaining cases the
prosecutor could not be faulted for declining prosecution on the existing
state of the record, but the files revealed disturbing shortcomings in
the whole process of evaluating complaints, as elaborated below.
t Benjamin Franklin Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
I Phila. Evening Bulletin, May 22, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
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No conclusion can be drawn from such a survey as to the frequency of particular practices either in the district attorney's office or
the police department. The files are, however, quite revealing as to the
nature of the problems confronting both agencies. I believe the following conclusions to be justified.

I. THE

DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE HAS NOT BEEN AND, IN THE
NATURE OF THINGS, COULD NOT BE, AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT
FOR CONTROLLING POLICE VIOLENCE

A. Conflict of Interest
It is in a hopeless conflict of interest position. Complaints of
police violence almost always arise in cases where the police are making
charges against the complainant-for example, assault and battery
against a policeman, resisting arrest, disorderly conduct-in addition to
the independent offense for which the police sought to arrest complainant (hereinafter C). At the same time C is charging the police
with, for example, beating or excessive violence. The district attorney
is cast as prosecutor of C on the first set of charges with the aid of the
police and as prosecutor of the police with the aid of C on the second
set of charges. The conflict of interest is actually institutionalized in
the structure of the district attorney's office, where a special Community
Rights Division, concerning itself with C's position, frequently finds
itself arrayed against other assistant district attorneys. The Community Rights Division seeks dismissal of charges or postponement of
the trial pending investigation of C's complaint, while the assistant
district attorney charged with prosecuting the defendant is naturally
inclined to go forward in reliance on the police testimony. It is fair to
say that the district attorney's office as a whole and its upper echelons,
to which the Community Rights Division reports, are basically oriented
towards the police. It could hardly be otherwise in view of the daily
cooperation essential between the police and the prosecutor. It is
absurd to expect a district attorney's office to secure a conviction of C
on the testimony of police officers for some substantive offense, like a
gang shooting, and then to turn around and prosecute the police witnesses on the ground that they unnecessarily beat C (and lyingly denied
it). To reverse the order of trial for two such cases would be even
more ridiculous, putting the district attorney in the position of using
unbelievable policemen to prosecute accused persons.
The foregoing is not to be understood as a criticism of the existence or operation of the Community Rights Division. On the contrary,
the establishment and continuance of such a division within the district
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attorney's office is essential so long as we have no truly independent
check on police behavior. Without the Community Rights Division the
conflict of interest in the district attorney's office would be merely less
visible, and no one would be expressly charged with the duty of
attending to the public interest in controlling abusive police behavior.
Given the limits within which it is compelled to operate, the Community
Rights Division can do and has done a useful job when staffed with a
courageous and persistent assistant district attorney.
The conflict of interest which disables the district attorney from
operating effectively on the police violence problem is occasionally
dramatized by publicized incidents: on one occasion the first assistant
district attorney reportedly seated himself for a time at the defense table
along with Police Commissioner Rizzo in a trial of two policemen for
assault and battery; on another occasion, Commissioner Rizzo, referring to the district attorney's institution of assault charges against the
policemen, said "Specter will rue the day he took up this one." 2
B. Police Investigation,
The Community Rights Division is almost wholly dependent
on police investigation. Prior to January 1969, by agreement between
the district attorney and the police department, complaints made to the
Community Rights Division had to be referred in the first instance to
the police department for investigation, and nothing was done until the
police department reported. Since that time, selected complaints have
been looked into by the Community Rights Division while the police
department is investigating. Another aspect of the agreement is still
in force: no policeman involved in a complaint will speak to anyone
outside the police department except with the approval of his superiors.
There is no indication in the files that such approval was ever sought or
given. Many files are closed with a notation that the Community Rights
Division concurs in the police department reports and finds "no acceptable evidence of any police mistreatment." Without suggesting that
all or any of the police reports are unreliable, it is clear that the district
attorney's office cannot effectively police the police when its major
source of information is the police department.
C. Policies Impeding Checks on the Police
Effective response by the district attorney's office to complaints
against the police is further impaired by several policies of the office
which, although justifiable from the point of view of limiting prosecution of policemen to cases likely to be won, undercut the deterrents to
police misbehavior. These policies are: (i) the "serious injury" policy;
2 Id., April 3, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
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(ii) the "complainant's satisfaction" policy; and (iii) the "mutual release" policy.
The serious injury policy means that the district attorney will
rarely move in cases where the police may have beaten a citizen without
cause if the citizen did not lose teeth or suffer some severe damage
preferably established by hospitalization records. This is understandable in view of the necessary police involvement in rough encounters
where minor physical violence is expectable: it will be difficult to
persuade a judge or jury beyond a reasonable doubt that a policeman
employed excessive or unprovoked force, against the policeman's sworn
denial, absent tangible evidence of substantial damage to C. But the
result is that the great majority of complaints which might merit discipline or reprimand, if not criminal prosecution, automatically drop
out of the district attorney's consideration.
The "complainant's satisfaction" policy is manifested in the disposition of complaints on a nonprosecution basis whenever C will be
satisfied if the policeman receives a reprimand or short-term suspension.
Sometimes a file gives evidence of an affirmative effort by the assistant
district attorney to secure agreement by C to some such compromise or
settlement. This process may end up with a "mutual release" understanding in which both sides drop their charges against each other.
Again, the practice is understandable from the point of view of a busy
prosecutor seeking to clear his docket of as many cases as possible. But
the adverse consequences and social cost of the practice are excessive:
cases which should result in some sanctions against the police are
washed out without even a reprimand to the policeman. An incentive
is established for the policeman involved in any complaint to file
charges against C for bargaining purposes, and sometimes such charges
are filed only after the private citizen has complained. From the point
of view of complainants, minority press, and civil liberties groups, the
credibility of both the district attorney and the police department
suffers when the law enforcement authorities seek to trade off charges
made by the police and charges made against the police. In one case
coming to my attention, there was pending a proposal to drop apparently well-supported charges that C fired shots at policemen in the
course of a gang fight if he would drop well-supported charges of police
brutality. The public interest would require that both charges be
pursued. The district attorney's office is not in a position to handle
both sides.
D. The Private Warrant
The law of Pennsylvania contemplates institution of criminal
proceedings without the approval or participation of the district attor-
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ney. This is done by the private complainant securing a warrant from
a magistrate 3 on the basis of an affidavit setting forth the facts of the
alleged criminal behavior. Two practices have grown up to restrict the
use of private warrants: there is a substantial charge for issuance of
such warrants, and the magistrates decline to issue them when not
previously approved by the district attorney. The district attorney's
approval can also relieve the applicant from the necessity of paying for
the warrant. Considering the responsibilities of the district attorney to
represent the state in carrying forward public prosecutions, these restraints make sense when applied to ordinary minor offenses, transitory
family "assault" charges, and the like. They do not make sense as
applied to complaints against the police, or indeed against any public
official with whom he may or may not have political alliance. The
district attorney, with the conflict of interest previously described,
should not be in the position of making preliminary judgments either
favorable or unfavorable to the complainant. Such judgments should
be made by the magistrate unencumbered by the prosecutor's prejudgment. Nor should citizens have to pay for the privilege of complaining against the authorities. It should be quite sufficient, for
example, that any member of the bar associates himself with the
complaint. And if that complaint survives scrutiny by the magistrate
(a scrutiny by no means hostile to the police), that member of the bar
might well be allowed to proceed as special prosecutor or "private
attorney general"-an arrangement that is quite familiar in some other
areas of law enforcement.4
II.

TYPICAL SHORTCOMINGS IN INVESTIGATION OF
COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE POLICE

A. Police Investigation of Police Is Not and Cannot Be Neutral
It tends to be defensive of the police and slanted against complainants. The police investigations studied varied in quality and
thoroughness. Some appeared to be complete and impartial; others
certainly did not. The point is not that investigating officers are dishonest or not trying to do a good job in most cases. It is simply that
the same conflict of interest which frustrates a fair and credible disposition of citizen complaints by the district attorney's office operates
even more strongly when the police department investigates itself on
complaints filed by persons whom the police department has already
3 Since January 1969, the functions of magistrates have been carried on by judges

of the municipal court. Subsequent references to magistrates in this paper should be
understood as referring to magistrates in the broad sense, including judges.
4 PA. STAT. tit. 19, §§ 1235, 1261 (1964).
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identified as violent criminals, some with long previous records. The
investigating officers or the commanding officers who report on the
incident are often superiors who have previously given very favorable
performance ratings to the subject policeman and who are likely to
continue to be in daily work relationship with him. Only the most
blatant offense, supported by incontrovertible evidence, could induce the
investigators and superiors to abandon their fellow officer. The illustrations below are drawn from the activities of both the Community
Rights Division and the police investigators.
B. An Unusually Heavy Initiative and Burden of Proof
Is Placed on the Complainant
When a complaint of criminal conduct is made against anyone
other than a policeman, a positive effort is made to follow up, find
supporting witnesses, and so forth. In the case of complaints against
the police, the bulk of the file is made up of statements by police witnesses. In one file, the district attorney investigator, asked by C's
lawyer to trace an important witness through his automobile registration, declined to aid in finding "your witnesses." In another file, the
police report failed to include any interview with C, taking the position
that he was "unavailable" because he was held in the House of Detention. Private witnesses for C are invited, and sometimes urged, to
come in to make a statement, but a failure to do so is likely to be taken
as indicating C's bad faith or lack of interest, either of which warrants
dropping the matter. But in fact the failure to pursue the complaint
may manifest fear or distrust of the law enforcement officials. Himself
a defendant, C must be aware that anything he says to the police may
turn up as evidence against him at his trial. In one file, the father of a
complainant declined to come in unless he could be accompanied by a
lawyer. The father had himself been arrested, without basis, at the
time of the incident involving his son, and had reason to believe that
statements he had previously volunteered were being misinterpreted
and used against his son.
C. Witnesses Against the Police Are Sometimes Examined
in a Hostile Atmosphere and Their Testimony
Unfairly Deprecated
In one case, C was examined by the investigator in the presence of
the accused policemen, with the explanation that they had a "right to
confront the witnesses against them." It is perfectly clear that such a
right exists only in the court where a trial is taking place, and that the
circumstances of this interview could only have been intimidating. In
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another file, C's statement that money had been taken from his wallet by
a policeman was dismissed on the basis that he had given "contradictory" acounts. My own appraisal of the transcript of his interrogation is that, although there were superficial inconsistencies probably
arising from the hostile questioning, his story hung together well
enough; at the very least, there was enough there to warrant seeking
out certain available disinterested witnesses. This was not done.
Another file included an examination of one of several disinterested
women who had observed the police brutality in the course of an arrest;
the interrogator pressed her for a concession that, even if the police had
used excessive force, she did not think they ought to be prosecuted or
be prejudiced in their employment. In several files, the mental competence of C was impugned without adequate justification. C is likely
to be characterized as a mental defective, not worthy of credence, on
the basis of a passing remark by a member of his family, or because he
has been treated by a psychiatrist. In two such instances, I was
surprised on reading the transcript to find the responses to the investigator's questioning entirely coherent and intelligent. Complainants are
sometimes addressed by first name during interrogation, a disrespectful
practice calculated to insult.
D. The Lie Detector
The police never take lie detector tests, and always insist that C
take one. When C agrees, the test is administered by a police lieutenant
under circumstances not disclosed in the files. His unfavorable report
is entirely summary: C appears to be lying. There is no description
of the test or the data that would make possible any independent
evaluation, although it is well-known that interpretation of the physical
data plays a large role in lie detection. The one case observed in which
the police-administered lie detection test was favorable to C involved a
very "well connected" white college boy whose story was obviously unassailable and corroborated by demonstrably false entries by the accused
policemen in their log-book.
Refusal by policemen to take lie detector tests, even those administered by the police department itself, results from the refusal of the
Fraternal Order of Police to supply free counsel to an accused policeman if he submits to such a test. An individual policeman is certainly
entitled to refuse to take a test, just as anyone is. But the collective
effort of the Fraternal Order of Police to penalize him if he chooses to
take the test seems to have only one conceivable purpose: to prevent
any unfavorable inference that might be drawn if some policemen
readily took and "passed" the test while others declined.
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In contrast, the pressure on complainants to take the test mounts
to the point of official impropriety. In one case, already referred to
above, where C was interviewed in the presence of two police officers
he accused, questions were first put to the officers as to their willingness
to take lie detector tests "if the Fraternal Order of Police doesn't
object." They of course agreed, knowing, as did the investigator, that
the Fraternal Order of Police does object. Their false willingness was
then used to persuade C to take the test.
E. Restricted Access to Police Witnesses
While the police investigators are free to interview anyone in the
course of the investigation, the policemen involved in the incident are
under orders not to talk to anyone outside the police department while
the police investigation is pending. This is pursuant to a formal agreement between the district attorney's office and the police department,
and it applies even to interviews by the Community Rights Division
of the district attorney's staff. Among the results of this restraint is
the inability of anyone other than the police to get a freshly recalled
account of what happened from the police point of view. By the time
anybody else gets into the picture the police story has solidified, contradictions ironed out, and the opportunity has been created for the
exertion of informal pressures among police officers themselves against
saying anything prejudicial to a fellow officer. One cannot know for
certain that any such thing occurs, but the community has cause for suspicion when an officially-sponsored practice is so favorable to "whitewash." The arrangement is perilously close to that condemned by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Lewis v. Lebanon County Court
of Common Pleas.5 In that case, District Attorney Lewis refused to
consent to defense attorney's interviewing an FBI expert. This blocked
access to the witnesses because the FBI had a rule that its agents would
not talk to a defense attorney without the district attorney's consent.
The Lebanon court then ordered the district attorney to consent, and
the supreme court affirmed this action, Chief Justice Bell dissenting.
Mr. Justice Jones's opinion for the court declared:
We are aware of no authority in the law which gives the
district attorney the right, in general, to deny defense counsel
access to the Commonwealth's witnesses. Under the ethical
standards of our profession, in the absence of special circumstances to which we hereinafter allude, the consent of the
district attorney should not be necessary to insure defense
counsel's right to interview a witness prior to the trial. The
5436 Pa. 296, 260 A.2d 184 (1969).
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primary purpose of a district attorney is not to convict, but to
see that justice is done.
[I]f it is possible that Agent Stombaugh might
have evidence which is favorable to the defendant, then the
suppression of that evidence may well constitute a denial of
due process.
It has been vigorously urged that there is a substantial
difference between affirmatively ordering a witness not to
talk with defense counsel, and merely advising the witness
that the prosecution does not consent to the interview. We
are not persuaded. In the majority of instances, as in the
case at bar, the effect of the prosecutor's expressed disapproval
would be to prevent defense counsel from speaking with the
witness until the witness testifies at trial. This result is
unsatisfactory. We are concerned with the interference by a
district attorney with the right of a defendant to interview
an otherwise willing witness.0
A minimum reform in this area would be the cancellation of the
agreement and order restricting access to police witnesses. Together
with the lowering of the private warrant barrier to prompt public
hearings before a magistrate, this would do much to open these unhappy
affairs to public view promptly after the events.
F. Internal Police Discipline: Vague Charges and Petty Penalties
The files provided some indications of areas for improvement in
internal disciplinary proceedings before the Police Board of Inquiry.
There is, in the first place, need for more precisely defined charges. In
the few cases resulting in disciplinary sanctions against policemen, the
charges were likely to be "conduct unbecoming an officer" or "disobedience of standing orders." Because these categories can include
any kind of misbehavior from the most serious to the most trivial, conviction on such charges tells the public very little about the nature of
the wrongdoing, and makes it easy to impose trivial penalties. In no
file was any penalty imposed beyond ten day's suspension, although in
one case the policeman was allowed to take a medical retirement on
the basis of psychiatric reports that were conflicting as to whether his
violent behavior was due to an identifiable mental illness or to chronic
irritation over social and racial conflicts. As a penalty for serious
misbehavior, a short suspension from duty is virtually meaningless.
It amounts to a requirement that the officer take part of his vacation
at the time of the suspension. lie does not even lose any pay. In one
6 Id. at 301-03, 260 A.2d at 188.
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file, an improper and utterly baseless arrest, unjustified clubbing, and
falsification of the patrol log resulted in such a short suspension. One
might have expected the separation of such policemen from the force
if the public and the courts are to have confidence in police testimony.
Among the precise categories of internal disciplinary charges on
which policemen should be tried, covering the most frequent classes of
incidents, would be: improper stop or other confrontation, illegal arrest,
illegal search, excessive force in effecting arrest, illegal attack upon a
person in custody, theft from a person in custody, false entry in official
reports.
G. Improper Confrontations
The files reveal that a substantial proportion of the encounters
leading to charges of lawless violence by the police begin with confrontations which a well-trained policeman should avoid:
(1) A black motorist is double-parked outside a store. A police
car pulls up, and the officer queries the double-parking. The motorist
explains that he has stopped momentarily to let his wife out and give
her money for shopping. Sharp words are exchanged, followed by
arrest, blows, and eventual charges of disorderly conduct, resisting
arrest, assault and battery on a policeman. The file does not make it
clear, but we may assume that the motorist provoked the police initially
by loud and disrespectful language. At that point the police were faced
with a choice-to dispose of the matter by coolly advising the motorist
he must move the car promptly, or to subject the motorist to an arrest
for "disorderly conduct," sure to be resented hotly as an escalation
of the unpleasantness over a trifle. The wrong choice leads in the
direction of violence.
(2) Police stop to question two black men pushing an automobile on a lot. They are told that the automobile has just been purchased
by the father and brother of one of them, the purchasers having just
gone off to a notary to conclude the formalities. The father and
brother return with the seller, a white man, who confirms that there
is no occasion for police concern. The police nevertheless insist on
"identification."
According to the police account itself, the brother
became indignant, loud, and disrespectful, but not profane or physically
aggressive. The police then made the critical decision, to "take the
whole job [that is, all four men] into the district where we can settle
this quietly." The brother then walked away towards his own car and
drove off. He was followed by police cars, stopped, and severely beaten
in the course of arrest. The arresting police and, later, the police
investigator in his report, indicated that the arrest was proper on the

1
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ground that complainant walked away from the police when they had
indicated they proposed to take him into the district "for investigation."
The file is an example of unwarranted police insistence on citizens
responding to inquiries. Without passing on the merits of the controversy over the beating (was it a savage, punitive beating following
submission to arrest, as reported by some independent witnesses, or
force necessary to overcome resistance?), the incident plainly grew out
of improper police persistence in a confrontation, and erroneous police
views that "boisterous" expression of resentment and peaceable departure when the police desire to continue questioning amount to
offenses for which they may and should arrest.
(3) A group of boys congregated on a street corner are ordered
away by a policeman, who cites the city curfew ordinance although
it is nearly an hour before curfew time. Complainant responds that
he is eighteen and therefore not subject to the ordinance. The policeman
asks for documentary identification showing age. The boy has none
but points to his grandmother standing at the door of her home a few
feet away. Without inquiry of her, the police take the boy into custody.
At a place not on the route from the place of apprehension to the
district station, the boy is beaten severely, losing three teeth. This
case resulted in a five-day suspension of the police. Like the previous
examples, it appears to be an outgrowth of unwarranted police interference and of the view of some policemen that any defiance of the
police constitutes disorderly conduct.
H. Inadequate Records and Public Disclosure Concerning
Complaints Against the Police
The files touch this problem only incidentally. They include some
press clippings expressing dissatisfaction, or correspondence with complainants' lawyers obviously uninformed about the results of investigations. Fuller disclosure would often dispel suspicion about the handling of complaints when, for example, it would be plainly improper
to prosecute and impossible to convict policemen on the unsupported
testimony of a complainant of doubtful character.
Among the things that appear to be needed or desirable would be
a central public registry and docket of complaints. This would include
complaints lodged with any agency, public or private. Under the
present system, complaints tend to flow to agencies from which complainants are most hopeful of getting action. Segments of the community having most confidence in the police are more likely to take
their complaints directly to the police department. Others seek the aid
of the Civil Liberties Union, the Human Relations Commission, the
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NAACP, or Philadelphians for Equal Justice. Announcement that the
district attorney's office is concerned will swell the flow of complaints
there; realization that only "serious injury" cases can be considered
for prosecution, or disappointment over delay and nonprosecution, tends
to divert complaints elsewhere. Dispersal of complaints makes it hard
to get accurate measurement of the total number of complaints, or to
identify officers and districts against which complaints are concentrated.
A central docket would also expose delay and record ultimate disposition of complaints. The district attorney files often conclude with
a memorandum closing the case so far as concerns the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a prosecution, but without any judgment, recommendation, or communication to the police department or the complainant. Although this is perhaps understandable in view of the
technical limitation of the district attorney's authority-he is responsible
only for the decision to prosecute or not prosecute-it leaves the issue
of the propriety of the police behavior unresolved, a highly unsatisfactory situation from the point of view of the public and the
complainant.
CoNCLUSION

As indicated earlier, relaxation of controls over private warrants
and elimination of restraints on access to police witnesses would contribute to prompt public airing of complaints against the police. However, one should not rely entirely on preliminary hearings on criminal
charges before magistrates. There are relationships between magistrates and the police that would prevent this from being wholly satisfactory and, in any event, the criminal law can play a role only in the
worst cases. It would probably be helpful if a complainant had an
opportunity to intervene within the police department itself at some
point before the department has made up its mind regarding a complaint. Such an opportunity to present his side of the matter in a
public hearing before the Police Board of Inquiry, or other quasijudicial body within the police department, as part of the police inquiry
rather than after its conclusion, might well reduce delay, give top
departmental officials a better opportunity to appraise the complainant's
case and the seriousness of the policeman's transgression, if any, and
enhance public confidence in police procedures. The benefits of such
a procedure would be maximized if the police tribunal included a recognizably independent person, perhaps rotated from a panel suggested by
affected interest groups.
It the final analysis, however, achievement of full confidence in
the law enforcement authorities will probably require an independent
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agency to hear and dispose of complaints, an agency having its own
investigators, subpoena power, and access to the courts. Whether this
agency would develop as a special unit to hear complaints against the
police, or with broader jurisdiction to hear complaints against public
officials generally (the "ombudsman"), or in the form of an independent board of public safety to supervise police and other safety
operations, as the board of education supervises the school system, is
a question beyond the scope of this research.

